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America's feffersonian Experiment: Remaking State Constitutions, 1820-1850,
by Laura J. Scalia. DeKalb: Northem Illinois University Press, 1999.
xxii, 218 pp. Notes, index. $36.00 cloth.
REVIEWED BY KERMIT L. HALL, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY
Nearly half of aU Americans, when asked by pollsters, respor\d that
they do not even know that their state has a constitution. Ironically,
sudi ignorance parallels the emergence of the so-called new federalism,
with its goal of devolving greater responsibilities on the states. As a
result, Laura J. Scalia's fine book on the theory of state constitutions is
particularly timely. Scalia joins historians such as Christian Fritz, Don-
ald Lutz, Daniel Elazar, G. Alan Tarr, Robert Williams, and Mark Kru-
man who, in the past 15 years, have begun to examine the history of
state constitution making to explain the diversity of America's politi-
cal and legal traditions. Not all scholars agree about the importance of
these state documents and the conventions that generated them. The
tradition of reading the American constitutional order from the van-
tage point of the federal Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court has
made the state documents of seemingly marginal importance. Yet
nothing could be further from the truth, according to Scalia, as a mat-
ter of either historical development or contemporary politics.
To make her case, Scalia analyzes constitution making during the
period from 1820 to 1850 in seven states—Massachusetts, New York,
Virginia, North Carolina, Louisiana, Ohio, and Iowa. In the case of Iowa,
its first constitution was framed in 1846. That strongly democratic doc-
ument prohibited slavery, restricted public bariking, declared univer-
sal suffrage, and provided for the election of judges. In Iowa and else-
where these were years of rich discussion about how best to balance a
commitment to popular sovereignty with the inalienable private rights
of all Americans. The federal Constitution struck this balance in favor
of private rights; the states, including Iowa, tuted in favor of popular
sovereignty. Through a careful reading of the debates in the state con-
ventions, Scalia argues that the federal Constitution of 1787 did not
represent America's definitive solution for negotiating its dual com-
mitment to private rights and popular sovereignty. The states took a
course different from and in some ways superior to that of the Union.
This finding provides the basis for the title of the book, America's
J^ersonian Experiment. From the beginning of the nation, a tension ex-
isted between the views of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The
former insisted that the best constitutions were based on reasoned dis-
course rather than self-interested popular politics. The latter, on the
other hand, viewed constitufional stability as deadening, even dan-
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gerous. The American constitutional experience, Jefferson insisted, re-
quired the power of the people to regenerate frequently new and bet-
ter fundamental laws while remaining attentive to original principles.
That meant, Scalia notes, that "laws that did not reflect the peoples'
contemporary understanding of the good state would ultimately lack
the authority and legitimacy necessary to enforce them" (157).
According to Scalia, the states of the mid-nineteenth century be-
came Jeffersonian laboratories for coristitutional experimentation. From
them emerged new ways of dealing with a host of issues. For example,
the expansion of suffrage made it possible to place greater account-
ability on the judiciary by having it popularly elected. The emphasis
on popular sovereignty also producecl often elaborate and far-ranging
declaratioris of rights as weU as finely detailed descriptions of what
government was supposed to do. For Madisonians, these code-like
documents, which sometimes reached to more than a hundred pages,
ceased to be constitutions; for Jeffersonians, they reflected the popular
adaptation of fundamental laws to changing circumstances.
Scalia understands that the framers of state constitutioris were at
once ideological and pragmatic. As a group they had a strong com-
mitment to the political liberalism associated with John Locke and
Adam Smith, but they were also determined to promote America's
white, Anglo-Saxon heritage. In the end, Scalia concludes, most of the
convention delegates, while theoretically freed by the people to do as
they wished, invariably looked back in time for first principles of good
government, principles that constrained the excesses of popular wiU.
The constitutions of the mid-nineteenth century climg to a vision of the
good state framed by existing beliefs in the natiire of citizenship and tra-
ditional schemes of institutional design (a two-house legislature, â sepa-
rate and distinct judiciary, and a bÜl of rights, for example) at the same
time that they experimented (eliiriinating religious oaths, extending the
suffrage, electing judges, and easing requirements for amendments).
America's J^ersonian Experiment limns the theoretical bases of a
little-appreciated state-based tradition of liberty. Yet Scalia achieves
her valuable theoretical insights by leaving the political landscape in
which change occurred more described than analyzed. For example,
readers will find orüy the barest explanation of the political, social, and
economic circumstances that informed the development of Iowa's
constitution of 1846. Only a larger and differently constructed book, of
course, could address these matters. However, what Scalia has done,
and done exceptionally well, is to remind us of the rich theoretical be-
quest of mid-runeteenth-century coristitution makers to the popularly
based traditions of American constitutionalism.

